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THE CIVIL SIDE OF JUDGE PARKER
MORTON GITELMAN*

The most famous federal district courtjudge in the nineteenth century was
Isaac C. Parker, the so-called "hanging judge." Because the Western District
of Arkansas retained jurisdiction over Indian Territory for more than twentyfive years, almost co-incident with Parker's tenure, it was the most active
criminal court in the federal system.' The Western District docketed more than
13,000 criminal cases in the twenty-one years that Parker presided, and he
tried a significant number of murder cases during this time Authors have
written many books about Judge Parker and his court,3 but they all tend to
focus on the "Wild West" aspect of the court and on the notorious criminal
characters that appeared in court and, often, on the gallows in Fort Smith.
This myriad of books and articles about Parker and the court, however, often
overlook the opinions that he wrote in the civil cases he handled. These civil
cases provide useful insight into the nature of Judge Parker's social and
political leanings, his judicial philosophy, and help. inform the proper
evaluation of his character in the broadest sense. This Article is devoted to
the civil opinions written by the judge both as district and circuit judge.4

*

Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. LL.M., 1965, University of

Illinois; J.D., 1959, DePaul University.
1. ROBERT H. TULLER, LET No GUILTY MAN ESCAPE: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY OF
"HANGING JUDGE" ISAAC C. PARKER 8 (2001)
2. Records of the District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21 (W.D. Ark.) (Nat'l
Archives & Records Admin., Southwest Region - Ft. Worth).
3. The first book, SAMUEL W. HARMAN, HELL ON THE BORDER: HE HANGED EIGHTYEIGHT MEN (1898), appeared two years after Judge Parker died. Harman was a frequent juror
in Parker's court and the owner of a hotel. J. Warren Reed, a prominent defense attorney in Fort
Smith who took many of the appeals from the Western District to the Supreme Court in the early
1890s provided the financial backing for the book. The book also lists C.P. Stems as
"compiler." The book, well over 400 pages, contains biographical sketches of court personnel
and some attorneys, lists of capital defendants with further dispositions of their cases, and a
considerable number of chapters devoted to the crimes and criminals that comprised the capital
case prosecutions. Although the book contains many inaccuracies, all subsequent biographies
rely on it to a great extent. Later books, e.g., FRED HARVEY HARRINGTON, HANGING JUDGE
(1951); GLENN SHIRLEY, LAW WEST OF FORT SMITH: A HISTORY OF FRONTIER JUSTICE INTHE
INDIAN TERRITORY, 1834-1896 (1968), clear up many of the inaccuracies, but also concentrate
entirely on the criminal episodes in Indian Territory. Even the latest, most scholarly book about
Parker's court, TULLER, supra note 1,discusses the criminal side of the court, albeit that it does
cover some of Judge Parker's jurisdictional rulings.
4. Congress established the Western District of Arkansas as both a district and circuit
court. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 24, 9 Stat. 594.
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The large number of criminal cases over Parker's twenty-one-year tenure
have overshadowed some 1400 civil cases docketed in that same period.'
Because the geographic jurisdiction of the court covered 74,000 square miles
of Indian Territory in addition to a substantial part of western Arkansas, a
number of civil cases - based on federal question jurisdiction - came from
Indian country, in addition to federal question and diversity of citizenship
cases originating in Arkansas.6
Parker filed about twenty-five written opinions in civil cases, approximately
half of those as a circuit courtjudge. Those opinions demonstrate quite well
that Judge Parker was a thoughtful, sometimes eloquent, jurist, who wrote
clear, well-organized opinions. As the following snapshots illustrate, one
striking aspect of Parker's written opinions is his penchant for elucidating
basic principles of law.
Bankruptcy
In Connerv. Scott,7 his first civil opinion, Judge Parker addressed the issue
of whether a defendant who claimed that his land deed was from a borrower's
assignee in bankruptcy could remove to federal court a state court suit to
enforce a vendor's lien on land. In Connor, Parker upheld the removal in an
opinion that demonstrates his "basic principles" approach. He wrote:
The field ofjurisdiction is a wide one, and one in which there are
frequently to be found many difficulties in the way of a correct
solution of the question.
The question involves the relative powers of the two systems of
courts, which are a part of our duplex system of government....
Jurisdiction is given to the courts of the Union in two classes of
cases. In the first, theirjurisdiction depends on the character of the
cause; in the second, the jurisdiction depends entirely on the
character of the parties.

5. 1875-1896 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. The statistical tables in these reports show that the

United States was a party in 609 out of 853 civil cases in the Western District of Arkansas.
Civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians arising in the territory fell into ajurisdictional
limbo most of the time; the tribal courts shunned those cases and the district court only had
jurisdiction over crimes in the territory becausejurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship did
not apply. Diversity jurisdiction is limited to suits between citizens of the several states. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
6. William H. Rehnquist, Isaac Parker,Bill Sikes and the Rule of Law, 6 U.ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 485, 487 (1983); see also Ex ParteKenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878)
(No. 7720).
7. 6 F. Cas. 313, 314 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1876) (No. 3,119).
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The first class comprehends all cases in law and equity, arising
under the constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties.... [T]he act of congress of the 3d of March 1875, which
provides for the removal of a certain class of causes, dependent
upon the subject matter of the same, is identical in meaning with
the clause of the second section of the third article of the
constitution ....
8
Parker then asked rhetorically, "Does the correct decision of this case depend
on the construction of a law of Congress? Or does the case involve any
question arising under a law of the United States?" 9 Parker answered by
reciting a series of questions to show that construction of the federal
bankruptcy law was involved, e.g., "Is a vendor's lien preserved in
bankruptcy? ...Can the holder of a lien enforce it after discharge? If so,
how? Can any one answer without placing a construction on the bankrupt
act?""0 Parker overruled the motion to strike the case from the docket, of
course, but made the following interesting statement:
I cannot pass this case without making a remark as to the
delicate position in which a judge of the federal court is placed
when called on to settle a question ofjurisdiction arising between
his own court and the court of a state, especially when that
question has been passed on by the judge of that court. Yet, with
due deference to the judge of the state court, and with high regard
for his opinions, I adopt the language of Chief Justice Marshall, in
Cohens v. Virginia, while speaking with reference to the
jurisdiction of the supreme court: "It is most true that this court
will not take jurisdiction if it should not, but it is equally true that
it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the
legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the
confines of the constitution; we cannot pass it by because it is
doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties a case
may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought before us; we
have no more right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given; the one or the other
would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which
we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do

8. Id.
9. Id.at315.
10. Id.at316.
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is to exercise our best judgment and conscientiously perform our
duty."' "1
Judge Parker was basically a legal positivist who strictly followed the law,
even in cases when he disliked the result. This strict adherence to the law is
clearly shown in a timber trespass case in which Judge Parker expressed his
frustration at having to rule the way he did. That case - although criminal is worthy of note.
The western progress of the railroads caused the denuding of vast forests
for timber. Because much of the land containing mature trees was public land,
this harvesting destroyed public resources at an alarming rate.'" In June 1878,
Congress finally responded to requests for action by passing the Timber and
Stone Act. 3 The Act made it a crime to take timber from "lands of the United
States which, in pursuance of law, may be reserved or purchased for military
or other purposes."' 4 Soon after passage of the Act, a criminal case forced
Parker to decide if the Act applied to lands of the Cherokee Nation. In United
States v. Reese," District Attorney W. H.H. Clayton charged the defendant by
an information with "unlawfully cutting timber on lands situated and lying in
the Cherokee Nation, in the Indian country, in the Western District of
Arkansas, which said lands, in pursuance of law, may be reserved and
purchased by the United States for military or other purposes."' 6 The

11. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821)).
12. Scholars have noted that
[tIhe rolling hills in eastern Oklahoma and western Arkansas were once home to
magnificent old forests of white oak and southern pine. During the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, the tall trees in these green reserves underwent an assault
unmatched in America's forest history. Though defined as "iron roads" in most
languages, railroads could have been more accurately designated as "wooden
roads." Rail line construction consumed great quantities of mature timber; a mile
of track took approximately 2,640 crossties, and it took an acre of forest to yield
200 ties (an average)....
... Railroad interests created and sustained a burgeoning timber market that
ravaged the forests of the Parker court jurisdiction throughout the last quarter of
the nineteenth century ....
Bradley W. Kidder, Who Took the Trees? A Review of Timber Trespass Litigation in the
Federal Court for the Western District of Arkansas Under the Administration of Judge Isaac C.
Parker, 1875-1896, at 3-4 (1996) (unpublished Masters thesis, University of Arkansas) (on file
with author).
13. Act of June 3, 1878, ch. 150, 20 Stat. 88.

14. Id.
15. 27 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1879) (No. 16,137).
16. d. at 743.
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defendant demurred on the grounds that the information did not state an
offense and that the court lacked jurisdiction. 7
Parker held that "[t]o determine the question whether these are lands of the
United States, requires a consideration of the title by which they are held by
the Cherokee Nation. To any one who has given any attention to this subject,
it presents a question not free from doubt or intrinsic difficulty."' ' 8 The case
required Parker to interpret the Treaty of May 6, 1828, wherein the United
States "agree[d] to possess and guarantee to the Cherokees, forever, seven
million acres of land" provided "that such lands shall revert to the United
States if the Indians become extinct or abandon the same."' 9 Judge Parker
analyzed the treaty in terms of property law and concluded that the Cherokee
Nation enjoyed fee simple title with a possibility of reverter."0 He therefore
held that he could not "see how these lands, which have been depredated
upon, can be held to be 'lands of the United States,' in the sense of the
language used in section 5388."2 Parker regretted having to hold the penal
statute inapplicable, because timber thieves regularly preyed upon the Indian
lands. He wrote:
It is to be regretted that it cannot be held to be an offence, as the
complaints of depredations upon the timber of the Indian lands are
constantly being made to officers of this court. There is a class of
men on the borders of Indian country who revel in the idea that
they have an inherent, natural right to steal from the Indians. This
right is not to be questioned. They think it a tyrannical use of
authority if they are interfered with.
There should be a law enacted, the penalty of which would teach
persons that Indians have rights which should be respected as well
as the rights of citizens. ...
If the law-making power will give us a law, we will lay its
mailed hand upon its violators in such a way that the timber in that
Indian territory will be protected from the rapacity of those who
are now stealing it. 2
Parker obviously felt strongly that he could not "bend" the law. That same
strict constructionist approach appears in a bankruptcy case in 1876 in which
the plaintiff-assignee in bankruptcy sued the bankrupt to set aside the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 743-44.
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id. at 746.
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discharge and recover property that the bankrupt fraudulently omitted from the
schedule - several pieces of diamond jewelry worth $5000.23 The bankrupt
asserted the statute of limitations as a defense.24 Parker held for the
defendant, stating:
The court has no hesitation in saying, if it be true, as alleged in the
petition, that the defendant was guilty of the act charged against
him, that it presents a most flagrant and outrageous case of fraud,
and one which this court will, if it can, aid in uncovering. But, bad
as this case may be, we must treat it legally, and if a remedy is
wanting under the law, it is not with the court (which does not
make laws, but construes and administers those already made), but
with the law-making power ....
From the language . . . and the general policy of the law of
bankruptcy, I am inclined to the opinion that congress intended to
limit the creditors, or any one representing them, to two years from
the date of the discharge, as the time alone within which they
might seek to set aside or annul the same. This is the interpretation ... by all well-considered cases. I am aware that a different
construction was placed upon the section by Judge Taft, of the
superior court of Cincinnati... where he held that the discharge
could be attacked at any time and in any court for fraudulent
concealment by the bankrupt. But, with all due respect to that
learned judge, I think this is not good law, that such a construction
is not deducible from the language of the bankrupt law, or from its
intent or spirit."
26 circulated
Notably, publications such as the Albany Law Journal
Judge
Parker's opinion. Parker's opinion is all the more interesting because Judge
Taft of Cincinnati later became President Taft and Chief Justice Taft.

Usury
Although Parker followed the law strictly, even when the result was
distasteful, he sometimes was able to suggest an alternative. This approach
can be seen in Kinsey v. Little River County." In Kinsey, the county 23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Pickett v. McGavick, 19 F. Cas. 588, 588 (W.D. Ark. 1876) (No. 7,829).
Id.
Id. at 588-89.
13 ALBANY L.J. 400 (1876).
14 F. Cas. 639 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1876) (No. 7,829).
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desirous of building a courthouse- borrowed $3000 from a Little Rock bank
and issued a note bearing 30% interest, with $5000 worth of county warrants
as collateral.2" The bank sold the warrants to the plaintiff for $1900.29 The
bank also sold the paper to the plaintiff, who later brought suit against the
county for $8200.30 The county claimed that the warrants were ultra vires
under Arkansas law and that the interest rate was usurious under the National
Bank Act.3" Parker found for the defendant, stating:
The rule of law is, that these warrants issued by counties are unlike
negotiable paper. They have not that quality of negotiable paper
which prevents an inquiry into its fraudulent character or its
consideration, when in the hands of an innocent holder for value
before due ....

I am therefore of the opinion that the plaintiff

cannot recover. I am of the opinion, however, the county having
received a sum of money from the bank, that this money, less the
amount which has been paid, can be recovered back, with legal
interest thereon, by an action of the proper kind, to wit, for money
had and obtained.32
In Dryfis v. Burnes,33 Parker held that a married couple that secured a
mortgage loan for $8000 at 10% interest could not claim usury based on an
agreement with an agent for 2% for negotiating the loan ." Citing an Arkansas
case, Parker found that the loan agency fee was not part of the sum paid for
the loan."
Judge Parker held in another case in which the plaintiff alleged a usurious
arrangement that even though the contract as he saw it was not usurious, it
was so unconscionable that the court would provide some form of relief. In
28. Id. at 640.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. Id. at 641. Often, Parker could not suggest an alternative to achieve justice. In Bland
v. Fleeman, 29 F. 669 (W.D. Ark. 1887), plaintiffs brought suit against the administrator of an
Arkansas estate for fraudulent dealings. Id. at 670. The plaintiff-heirs were residents of
Tennessee and Mississippi. Id. Unfortunately, two or three of the heirs were Arkansas
residents, and the plaintiffs attempted to keep the case in federal court by naming them as
defendants. Id. at 671. In finding that thejoinder of these parties was collusive, Judge Parker
wrdte, "It is with some degree of regret that I feel compelled to hold that the court has no
jurisdiction, as, from the examination of the facts of the case, I am led to the conclusion that the
acts of Fleeman... bristle with fraud." Id. at 674.
33. 53 F. 410 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1892).
34. Id. at411.
35. Id. at 410 (citing Vahlberg v. Keaton, 11 S.W. 878 (Ark. 1889)).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
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Tilley v. American Building & Loan Ass 'n,36 the plaintiff seeking to borrow
$30,000 on his farm in Sebastian County, agreed to subscribe for 600 shares
of stock in a Minnesota building and loan association." The agreement
provided that Tilley would pay $360 per month as dues on the stock for nine
years, a total of $38,880.38 The association in turn loaned Tilley $30,000 on
his stock with 6% interest, secured by a mortgage on the land. 39 At the end of
the nine years, Tilley was to surrender his stock.40 Judge Parker grudgingly
found that the payments on the stock were not interest because they were not
made for the use of the money borrowed, but to acquire a partnership interest
in the association.4 ' Judge Parker, however, found that even if the contract
was not usurious as a matter of law, it could be viewed as one sided, unjust,
unconscionable, or otherwise inequitable,42 stating that a court
may refuse to enforce so much of the contract as is inequitable or
harsh, or will work a hardship on the plaintiff.., or, because the
court may construe the sum named in the bond as a penalty, it may
give such relief as may be responsive to the demands of equity and
good conscience.43
County Indebtedness
Suits on Arkansas county warrants were common in the 1880s, as counties
often defaulted on their obligations. Some of these suits found their way into
Parker's court. In two such cases, ten years apart, Parker filed opinions. In
NationalBank of Western Arkansas v. Sebastian County,44 the bank, having
purchased county warrants, brought suit to collect on those warrants.4 s The
county argued that an Arkansas statute passed in 1879 had repealed the
36. 52 F. 618 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1892).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 619.
Id.
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id. at 620-21.
ld. at621.
Id. at 627. Judge Parker wrote:
The relief that would meet this demand would be to decree the amount of the
$30,000 advanced, with 6 per cent. [sic] interest on the same, less the year's
interest already paid in advance, and to decree the foreclosure of the mortgage
given to secure the payment of the debt, and to cancel the remaining part of the
contract ....

Id.
44. 17 F. Cas. 1209 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1879) (No. 10,040).
45. Id. at 1210.
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statutes providing that a county could sue or be sued.
and Parker sustained the demurrer, reasoning:

6

The bank demurred,

It is a proposition not debatable that the legislature of the state
cannot take away the right of the plaintiff to sue in a federal court,
as such right is secured by a law of congress, which, with the
constitution of the United States, is the supreme law of the land.47
The same issue came up in 1889 in Hoover v. Crawford County.4 Again,
Parker ruled against the county, stating the proposition more forcefully:
The purpose of the legislature evidently was to take away from
the federal courts the right to entertain a suit against a county in the
state.... Previous to that time [1879, when the Arkansas statute
was passed] many suits had been brought in the federal courts in
the state against counties upon evidences of indebtedness similar
in character to these sued on in this suit. Judgments had been
obtained, and payment compelled, by such courts .... This act
seems to me to be but the exhibition of a foolish and futile purpose
founded on an unwarrantable and unreasonable prejudice against
federal courts, which are as much the courts of the whole people as
the courts of the counties or of the circuits in a state.49
Another suit against a county forced Parker to decide a motion to transfer
the proceedings from the Western District to the Eastern District federal court
on the ground that, after the plaintiff filed the case in the Western District,
Congress changed the makeup of the federal districts and put Woodruff
County, the defendant, into the Eastern District.5" Parker held that once
jurisdiction attaches, a subsequent realignment of districts does not deprive
the court of jurisdiction." He based his ruling on a Supreme Court decision
holding that when Congress created the Western District of Arkansas in 1851,
cases pending in the old District of Arkansas did not have to be transferred."

46. Id.
47. Id. at 1211.
48. 39 F. 7 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1889).
49. Id. at 8. The Arkansas Act in question provided in section 2 that persons having
demands against counties must present them in county court for acceptance or rejection. Id.
50. Culver v. Woodruff County, 6 F. Cas. 949 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 3,469).
51. Id. at950.
52. Id (citing United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 467 (1853)).
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Indian TerritoryProblems
Two of Judge Parker's opinions addressed major issues of Indian rights and
federal court jurisdiction. In both cases, Parker ruled against the tribal
interests. One involved the Creek Nation and the other the Cherokee Nation.
In the reconstructionist Indian treaties of 1866, the tribes agreed to cede
their nonsettled lands to the federal government upon demand and payment."
The idea behind this provision was either to purchase tribal lands for the
purpose of settling other tribes in Indian country, or to have sufficient land to
settle the Negro slaves who the slave-holding tribes agreed to emancipate in
the treaty and, possibly, ex-slaves from the defeated South. 4 This provision
proved to be troublesome in the 1880s when the boomers" insisted that those
lands were open to homesteading. 6 The provision also caused dissension
within tribal councils, and became the wedge by which the railroads invaded
Indian Territory.5 7
8 Judge Parker
In the case of United States ex rel. McIntosh v. Crawford,"
was faced with an unusual claim. In 1889, the Interior Department began
negotiating with the Creek Nation to purchase their unsettled lands for $2.28

53. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Cherokee Nation of
Indians, Aug. I1, 1866, 14 Stat. 755, available at 1866 WL 8570.
54. JEFFREY BURTON, INDIAN TERRITORY AND THE UNITED STATEs, 1866-1906, at 27-30
(1995).
55. The so-called "boomers" were a group of whites who hungered to settle Indian lands
not occupied by Indians. This group, whose most prominent leader was David L. Payne,
claimed that any lands not actually occupied by Indians were public lands open to homesteading
on the theory that the Indian nations had ceded those lands to the United States in the 1866
treaties. As the boomers grew in number, they set up camps on the southern border of Kansas
and began to plan their occupation of unassigned lands in the Indian Territory. On April 26,
1880, Payne led a small party of boomers across the Kansas line. They began staking claims
and built a stockade on the Canadian River not far from present-day Oklahoma City. Federal
troops arrested Payne and his group and escorted them to the Kansas border, where they were
hailed as heroes. A second incursion in July resulted in the Army taking the boomers into Fort
Smith to appear before Judge Parker. District Attorney Clayton filed a civil complaint against
Payne under the intercourse laws on August 13, 1880. Demurrers and motions to dismiss and
counter-motions delayed the decision in the case until May, 1881. Parker ruled against the
boomers, holding that the unassigned lands were not open to homesteaders, and fined Payne
$1000, the maximum under the intercourse law. United States v. Payne, 8 F. 883 (W.D. Ark.
1881); see also United States v. Rogers, 23 Fed. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1885). On the history of the
boomers, see BURTON, supra note 54, at 138-202.
56. See BURTON, supra note 54, at 138-202.
57. See id.
58. 47 F. 561 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891) (annotated in 81 A.L.R. 497).
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million.59 Even though an international tribal council determined in 1888 to
resist all attempts to purchase land from the nations, just a year later the
Creeks and Seminoles decided to sell off lands they would never need.60
These lands would form the nucleus of the new territory of Oklahoma to be
opened for settlement.6 The Creek Nation sent a three-man delegation to
Washington - Pleasant Porter, David M. Hodge, and Espar Hecher.62 In
1885, the delegation had retained Samuel J. Crawford and others as agents for
the Nation in negotiations with the government.63 The agreed fee was
$270,283.71." The relators, disaffected members of the Creek Nation, filed
suit in Parker's court alleging that the contract for legal services was
fraudulent and designed to cheat the Creek Nation out of its money.6
Crawford, a former Governor of Kansas and a resident of that state, made a
special appearance to contestjurisdiction over him.66 Judge Parker agreed that
his court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the suit.6 7 The opinion relies on
fundamental concepts of service of process and begins with the Judiciary Act
of 1789. Parker states:
The rule that a person can be sued in any court of the United
States, and required to leave his home, and travel thousands of
miles, it may be, to defend the suit, is an extremely harsh and
oppressive one, and one that may work a great hardship upon the
party sued.68
Parker also found that his court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.69 In that
part of the opinion, he analyzed the set of statutes passed to protect Indians
from overreaching contracts by requiring the government to vet all contracts
with Indians or Indian tribes. A specific provision in those statutes provided
that no money belonging to Indians arising from the sale of their lands should
be paid to any agent or attorney without meeting certain stringent conditions. 0
Judge Parker, however, found that the Congressional Act of March 1, 1889,
which consummated the sale of the Indian lands to the United States,
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 562-63.
Id. The Seminole deal was for about the same amount as the Creek sale. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

65. Id.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 564.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 571.
Id.
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specifically authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to "pay out of the
appropriation hereby made the sum of $280,857.10 to the national treasurer
of the Muskogee (or Creek) Nation, or to such persons as shall be duly
authorized to receive the same." 7' Parker held that Congress intended to
bypass the older statutes, and he cited correspondence from the Secretary of
the Interior to the Chairman of the House Indian Affairs Committee
recognizing the deal the tribe had made in 1885 - a contingent fee
arrangement with former Governor Crawford.7"
Although this case did not focus on the impending Oklahoma land rushes
in which the government opened sections of the new territory for settlement,
the Creek and Seminole land deals were immediately responsible for the white
settlement of central Oklahoma; the population of Oklahoma City, Guthrie,
and surrounding towns zoomed, growing almost overnight from a few dozen
at Oklahoma Station (the earlier designation) to 10,000 in Oklahoma City.73
What the boomers tried to do in 1880 thus became reality ten years later.
The second important civil case dealing with Indian rights came before
Judge Parker in 1888 in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas RailroadCo.74
71. Id.at 568-69.
72. Id.at 569-70. Burton states:
The presence in this Creek delegation of men as keenly opposed to one another as
Porter and Espar Hecher, and the Muskogee national council's prompt ratification
of the agreement, suggest that the tribe was more united on this issue than on any
other in its history. There was a dissident group whose leaders threatened to kill
the whole delegation, but it never came out into the open and soon subsided into
silence.
BURTON, supra note 54, at 149. The federal legislation directed that the U.S. Treasury would
keep the balance of $2 million at 5% interest, the interest to be paid annually to the Creek
Nation. Crawford,47 F. at 568.
73. President Harrison proclaimed that the central portion of Oklahoma would open to
homesteaders on April 22, 1889, at noon.
At the appointed moment, cavalry trumpets and firearms signaled the start of
"Harrison's Horse Race" from various points along the perimeter of the
Unassigned Lands. Simultaneously, in the heart of the district, thousands of men,
mainly members or employees of Kansas townsite companies, crawled out of
freight cars or swarmed out of the long grass by the railroad tracks to scoop the
real prizes - the most promising town lots in Guthrie and Oklahoma City.
BURTON, supra note 54, at 155. This first land rush was rife with corruption. A number of
those who emerged from the railroad cars were federal officials who wore deputy marshals'
badges and acted as agents for the land-grabbers. One of them was Parker's chief prosecutor,
W. H.H. Clayton, who lost his position after a Senate Judiciary Committee report found that he
had misused his office to buy up land before the territory was officially open for settlement. See
Mary M. Stolberg, Politician,Populist, Reformer: A Reexaminationof "HangingJudge"Isaac
C. Parker,47 ARK. HIST. Q. 3, 25 n.55 (1988).
74. 33 F. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1888), rev'd, 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
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The Cherokee Nation filed for an injunction to stop a railroad from building
a line south of the Kansas border across Cherokee lands." An Act of Congress
on July 4, 1884, granted the Southern Kansas Railway Company (Southern
Kansas) a right-of-way to build a line across the Cherokee lands.76 The
Cherokee National Council passed an Act on December 12, 1884, to protest
with the Secretary of the Interior;" the Act also instructed the tribe's
Washington delegates to resist any building or maintenance of a rail line.78 In
1886, the Southern Kansas filed a map with the Department of the Interior
locating its proposed line, and in April of that year, the Cherokee Nation
renewed its protest and rejected any purported compensation provided for in
the 1884 statute. 79 The Department of the Interior ignored the protests,
appointed three commissioners to assess compensation, and approved the
construction of the line.8" The commissioners assessed compensation at a
little over $7300 for the right-of-way for the main line and branches."1
The Cherokee Nation strongly resisted the rail line, knowing that it would
be a magnet for white settlers. 2 The Indian tribes were well aware of the
troubles that came with the railroads, especially the introduction of
intoxicating liquor and the theft of timber for crossties.83 The Cherokees also
felt that even if they could not stop the construction of the line, the
compensation awarded by the commissioners was wholly inadequate; the
Nation thought that the right-of-way was worth at least $500 per mile.84
The suit asked for an injunction to stop further construction, removal of the
ten miles of track already built, or, in the alternative, an appeal from the
monetary award of the commissioners as being inadequate." The railroad
attorneys filed a demurrer on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, want of
equity, and improperjoinder of legal and equitable causes of action. 6
In a lengthy opinion, Judge Parker explored the nature and basic status of
the Cherokee Nation. 7 He concluded that the Nation owned the land in fee
75. Id. at 902-03.
76. Act of July 4, 1884, ch. 179, 23 Stat. 73. The line was to run from the Kansas border
to Dennison, Texas.
77. Cherokee Nation, 33 F. at 902.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. BURTON, supra note 54, at 54-55.
83. FORT SMITH ELEVATOR, June 29, 1887, at 5.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Cherokee Nation, 33 F. at 902.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 904.
Id.
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simple, with a possibility of reverter in the national government - the
condition being abandonment by the tribe or its extinction. 8 However, the
Cherokee Nation, politically, did not enjoy the status of a sovereign. It was
not a state, nor an independent political entity but, rather, a dependent Indian
tribe. 9 Not being a sovereign, the right of eminent domain - an attribute of
sovereignty - rested in the United States, not in the Cherokee Nation.9"
Consequently, the United States could legislate to take Cherokee Nation lands
for public purposes like a railroad. 9' Finally, as to the valuation of the land,
Parker held that, because the bill for equitable relief failed, the plaintiff could
not join the alternative request for money damages and would have to seek
relief on the law side of the federal court.92 Thus, Judge Parker sustained the
demurrer and dismissed the bill without prejudice.93 The Nation appealed to
the Supreme Court. In an opinion written by Justice Harlan,94 the Court
upheld Parker's reasoning and decision on both the sovereignty issue and the
improperjoinder.95 Justice Harlan held, however, that the district court could
bend the joinder rules slightly and treat the compensation issue as an appeal
from the commissioners' valuation as provided in the statute.9 6 The Court
remanded the case to Parker, and in 1892 he awarded the Nation the original
amount set by the commissioners plus the costs of appeal to the Supreme
Court.9 7 The railroads, with all their promise and troubles, could not be kept
out of Indian country. The bitter disappointment of the Cherokee Nation was
ameliorated, however, when enterprising Cherokees found that profit and
prosperity could follow through the opening of national markets for cattle,
grain, and other products.98
Judge ParkerandRailroads
Even though the railroad won the right to continue its line across the
Cherokee lands, and Parker's jurisdictional views meant that federal courts
88. Id. at 905.
89. Id. at 907.
90. Id.
91. Id. at910.
92. Id. at 915.
93. Id.
94. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
95. Id. at 651,653-54.
96. Id. at 641.
97. Id. at 661.
98. During 1889, for example, the Cherokee Nation was negotiating a lease to run for
fifteen years with the Cherokee Strip Live Stock Association that was worth $6.6 million.
BURTON, supra note 54, at 159. The Choctaw Nation had valuable coal mining leases. Id. at
109.
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could not override congressional grants of right-of-way, Parker was no friend
of the railroads. He authored several opinions with a railroad as a party that
show that the railroads could not expect favorable treatment in his court.
In personal injury cases, Judge Parker would often give favorable jury
instructions for plaintiffs and uphold large damage awards. For example, in
Shumacher v. St. Louis & San FranciscoRailway Co.," a railroad employee
was on top of gravel cars when, in a switching operation, the cars were run
down an incline and the brakeman was unable to stop or slow the cars.' 00 The
cars slammed into the train, throwing the plaintiff onto the tracks.'0 ' The train
ran overthe employee's foot, and doctors eventually amputated his leg.' 2 The
plaintiff sued for $15,000 in damages, and the jury awarded $8000.'"' The
railroad moved for a new trial based on the judge's refusal to give several
defense instructions.'0 4 Parker denied the motion and pointed out that the
conductor had a duty to
know that one brakeman managing one brake could not control that
train of 10 loaded cars.... It seems to me from the testimony that
there was an entire absence of that prudent and proper care which,
when there is a failure to exercise it, shows that conscious
indifference to consequences which makes a state of case in which
there is constructive or legal willfulness.' 5
Parker also stated that, in light of the evidence, he was justified in giving the
plaintiff's instruction on the injury being produced by a willful act.'0 6 Finally,
Parker noted that although at one time he thought the damages were excessive,
he would not interfere in the absence of a showing that the jury was swayed
by prejudice, preference, partiality, passion, or corruption. ' 7
In the autumn of 1889, Parker was in a position to chastise the Southern
Kansas Railway, whose invasion of Indian country he upheld less than a year
earlier. In Briscoe v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., 8 the plaintiff brought a
suit against the railroad for negligently killing his horses. The railroad
challenged the verdict for the plaintiff in a post-trial motion on the grounds
99. 39 F. 174 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1889), rev'd sub nom. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v.
Schumacher, 152 U.S. 77 (1894).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 175.
102. Id. at 176.
103. Id.

104. Id.
105. Id at 177.
106. Id. at 180.
107. Id.
108. 40 F. 273, 275 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1889).
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that the court did not have jurisdiction under the statute that had authorized
the building of the railroad and that, in any event, the court could not hold the
Southern Kansas liable because it had leased the operation of the railroad to
the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe prior to the incident.'0 9 Judge Parker
overruled the motion for a new trial, held that the Western District court had
jurisdiction under the statute, and found the lease unauthorized." 0
As to jurisdiction, the statute that authorized the railroad provided that the
federal district courts for the Western District of Arkansas, the Western
District of Texas, and the District of Kansas would have concurrent
jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy, in suits between the
Southern Kansas and the nations or tribes through whose territory the railroad
ran."' These courts also shared jurisdiction over "'controversies arising
between the inhabitants of said nations or tribes and said railway company...
without distinction as to citizenship of the parties.""' 2 The railroad argued
that the statutory provision only applied to controversies over the right-of-way
and not to common law torts." 3 Parker disagreed:
If this proposition is true, the nation or tribe, or the inhabitants
thereof, were left by congress without any remedy for torts
committed by the railroad company, for, as there is no remedy for
torts such as was sued for in this case at the place where the same
was committed, there could be no remedy anywhere. As the
plaintiff could not sue in the Indian country, he could not sue
anywhere." 4
On the question of the lease, Parker found that the enabling statute said
nothing about any right of the railroad to lease the operation of the line and,
even if Kansas law permitted such a lease, the express language of Congress
prevailed."'
Parker found that the use of the words "assigns" and
"successors" did not imply that the corporation could transfer its property and
franchise by lease." 6

109. Id.at 278.
110. Id.
111. Id.at275.
112. Id.(quoting Act of July 4, 1884, ch. 179, 23 Stat. 73).
113. ld.at 275-76.
114. Id.at 276.
115. Judge Parker wrote, "'The said Southern Kansas Railway Company shall accept this
right-of-way upon the express condition, binding upon itself, its successors and assigns, that
they will [not try to get more land from the tribes]."' Id.at 279 (quoting Act of July 4, 1884,
ch. 179, 23 Stat. 73).
116. Id.
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As another example, in 1892 Judge Parker heard a wrongful death case
brought by the widow and children of the yard master of the Frisco line in Fort
Smith." 7 The jury brought in a very large (for that time) verdict for the
plaintiff of$17,820.' '"Judge Parker rejected a motion for a new trial that was
based on eleven grounds.' 9 The tenth ground - that the damages were
excessive and "rendered under the influence of prejudice or passion" generated a strong response from Parker. 2 ° Initially, he noted that the
deceased's age, physical strength, life expectancy, and training indicated that
the amount of damages was not shocking to a sense ofjustice.' 2 ' Then, Judge
Parker, in addressing the rule that grief could not be the basis for damages in
such a wrongful death action, said:
When we have a statute so barbaric, and almost brutal, as to
prohibit the consideration by the jury of that terrible agony, grief,
and suffering of the faithful wife and little children for their loss by
death of such a husband and father as Dwyer, we should award
fairly compensatory damages. The award should be made with a
reasonably liberal spirit. Under this statute, man is considered only
as an animal, a beast of burden, like a horse or a mule, with
nothing to be considered when he is killed by negligence but his
earning capacity.' 22
Accordingly, Judge Parker went as far as he could possibly go to help
plaintiffs who were the victims of railroad negligence.
Parker would, however, sometimes rule against overreaching plaintiffs. For
example, in Stephens v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co.,123 the
plaintiff, an Arkansas resident, filed suit against the Frisco in Arkansas state
court in Washington County alleging that he had been thrown off a train in
Missouri in the middle of hisjourney from one point in Missouri to another.' 24
The plaintiff claimed damages of $4999.'25 The railroad filed to remove the
case to federal court. 26 On the same day, the plaintiff amended his complaint
to ask for damages in the amount of $1999.12? The plaintiff then sought to
117.
118.
119.
120.

Dwyer v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 52 F. 87 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1892).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 87-90.
Id. at 89.

121. Id. at 90.
122. Id.
123. 47 F. 530 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891).

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 530-31.
Id.
Id. at 531.
Id.
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have the case remanded to state court on the ground that the amount in
controversy was less than the requisite $2000.12 Judge Parker obtained a
transcript of the Washington County Circuit Court proceedings and found
that - contrary to the plaintiff's assertions - the petition for removal was
filed at 1:30 p.m. on May 15 and the amendment
was not asked for by plaintiff
29
until at least 5:00 p.m. on that day.1
In that same case, and in another one that same year, 13 1 Parker had to decide
the jurisdictional issue of whether the Frisco was a Missouri or Arkansas
corporation, or both. In the Stephens case, the plaintiff argued that the federal
court did not have jurisdiction because both the plaintiff and the defendant
were Arkansas residents. 3 ' In James v. St. Louis & San FranciscoRailway
Co., a few months earlier, Parker had overruled the Frisco's demurrer to
jurisdiction in a wrongful death case brought by a Missouri widow based on
negligence in Monett, Missouri. 3 2 Parker found that the Frisco, a Missouri
corporation, had become a domestic Arkansas corporation under the
provisions of an 1889 Arkansas statute.'3 3 The two cases, taken together,
established that the Frisco railroad was a citizen of both states for diversity
jurisdiction purposes.
Another interesting railroad case, not involving personal injuries - but of
great interest in Fort Smith - addressed the construction of a bridge across
the Arkansas River, connecting the city with Indian country.'34 From the time
the Western District Court came to Fort Smith in 1871, those in Indian country
could only get to the city by ferry or skiff. As the city grew and commerce
with the Indians increased, the City of Fort Smith sought to construct a bridge.
A bridge was also in the mind's eye of railroad tycoon Jay Gould, who sought
to control most of the railroads leading into the Indian Territory. His control
of the Missouri Pacific line included the Kansas and Arkansas Valley
Railroad, a line that ran to Fort Smith, On the other side of the river, Gould's
interests included the Kansas & Texas, a north-south line through Indian
Territory. In 1891, the Kansas and Arkansas Valley began to construct a
bridge over the river including a foot path and a wagon path.'35 Plaintiffs
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. James v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 46 F. 47 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891).
131. Stephens, 47 F. at 531.
132. James, 46 F. at 47.
133. Id.
134. Payne v. Kan. & Ark. Valley Ry. Co., 46 F. 546 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891), rev d, 49 F.
114 (C.C.A. Ark. 1892).
135. James Oakley Murphy, The Work of Judge Parker in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - 1875 to 1896, at 21 (1939) (unpublished Master's
thesis, University of Oklahoma) (on file with author). The wagon and footpath were important
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brought suit in Judge Parker's court to enjoin the condemnation of land for
construction of bridge approaches for use by wagons and persons on foot on
the theory that the railroad's right-of-way grant did not include the right to
build a wagon or foot bridge on the right-of-way.'36 The plaintiff was the
operator of a ferry across the Arkansas River, who stood to lose business if
people could cross the bridge by wagon or on foot.'37 Parker refused to
dissolve the temporary injunction he had granted because the grant of right-ofway was for a railroad bridge and, in Parker's view, the construction of a
wagon and foot approach amounted to imposing an additional servitude on the
plaintiff's land. 3
Parker expressed regret in his opinion:
I have arrived at the conclusion that defendant has now no power
to condemn the land of plaintiffs for use as an approach for a
wagon and footway bridge; and to get the right, and use the same
for such purpose, defendant must either go to congress for
authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, or negotiate with
plaintiffs for the use of the right-of-way as an approach to its
wagon and footway bridge. It is in my judgment a matter of great
regret that authority to condemn has not been given, as it works
delay in the completion of a great thoroughfare, which will be an
important agency in securing the development, progress, and
prosperity of the country, and consequently of great and lasting
benefit to the people. 39
Attorney John H. Rogers, who would succeed Parker on the court,
immediately appealed to the newly created Circuit Court of Appeals, and, on
January 5, 1892, the appellate court reversed and dissolved the injunction. 4 °
The formal dedication of the new bridge attracted some 25,000 people to Fort
Smith, and a banquet for 200 distinguished guests was held in the Main Hotel
on the evening of the dedication, lasting until 3:00 a.m. the next day.' 4 '

to Gould because the bridge was to be a toll bridge. Id.
136. Payne, 46 F. at 548.
137. Id. at 550.
138. Id. at 560-61.
139. ld. at 561.
140. Kansas & A.V. Ry. Co. v. Payne, 49 F. 114 (C.C.A. Ark. 1892). The court determined
that the footbridge was within the legislative grant and that if it caused increased damages to the
plaintiffs lands, a remedy at law for additional compensation was available. Id. at 119.
141. Kidder, supra note 12, at 69.
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Miscellaneous Civil Cases
Although Judge Parker's opinions in civil cases may have been few over
the years, a wide variety of interesting cases came into his court. For example,
in one trademark infringement case, Judge Parker held that the similarity of
defendant's plug tobacco to the plaintiff's product would create confusion
among members ofthe general buying public, thus warranting an inj unction.42
Parker utilized the test of comparing the two products with his own eyes.'4 3
As another example, in UnitedStates v. Culver,"' Parker cancelled two land
patents on the ground that the defendants made false representations in
making a cash entry for agricultural lands with full knowledge that the lands
1 45
were mineral lands and thus not open to entry.
Judge Parker also adhered to the majority rule in dismissing a cause of
action for mental suffering against a telegraph company for failure to deliver
a wire. In Crawson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 46 the plaintiff
complained that a telegraph company failed to deliver a telegram - sent from
Sallisaw to Van Buren beseeching him to come to Sallisaw on the evening
train to see his mother-in-law who was dying and wanted all her family in
attendance - and that he was thus prevented for a period of twenty-four hours
from going to the bedside of his mother-in-law.4 7 The plaintiff claimed that
he suffered great anguish and uneasiness of mind. 48 Parker stated the issue
as whether the plaintiff could recover for mental suffering alone,
unaccompanied by any other injury. 49 Parker sustained the defendant's
demurrer, recognizing that the Supreme Courts of Indiana, Alabama,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas had upheld causes of action for mental
suffering alone due to negligent delay in delivering telegrams. 50 Parker
stated, however, that these cases lacked support in other states or in English
common law.'
142. Liggett & Myer Tobacco Co. v. Hynes, 20 F. 883 (W.D. Ark. 1884). See the famous
dissenting opinion of Judge Jerome Frank in Triangle Publications,Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d
969, 976-77 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting), discussing the problem of how judges and
courts of law can determine ifthere is actual confusion among products or confusion over names
in the absence of independent scientific surveys.
143. Liggett, 20 F. at 885.
144. 52F. 81 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1892).
145. Id. at82-83.
146. 47 F. 544 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891).
147. id. at 545.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 546.
151. Id.
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Parker also faced another unusual issue in a habeas corpus proceeding
brought by a Fort Smith police officer who the Fort Smith police court judge
had jailed for contempt for refusing to return a woman to jail. Police had
jailed the woman for nonpayment of a $5 fine and $1.50 in court costs, and
later released her by order of the mayor because of her health.'
In In re
Monroe, Parker granted the writ on behalf of both the police officer and the
woman, finding that the Fort Smith ordinances authorized the mayor to release
prisoners from the local jail for reasons of health.'
In the course of the
opinion, Judge Parker said:
[D]oes the federal court have jurisdiction to issue a writ in behalf
of the liberty of a citizen who is alleged to be illegally restrained?
How far may the federal court go in its investigation of the legality
of the process, which, as is alleged, is in restraint of the liberty of
a citizen of the state, or of the United States? There seems to be a
misconception in the public mind as to the power of the federal
court in this regard, and it is a mystery in my mind how that
misconception can exist in the face of the constitution and laws of
the United States. There is no invasion of any prerogative or
power of the state by the exercise of jurisdiction of this kind,
because there is no prerogative that belongs to any state, nor is
there any power orjurisdiction in a state to deprive any citizen of
liberty without due process of law. 54
Perhaps we should remember Judge Parker as a civil libertarian judge instead
of as the "hanging judge."
Conclusion
The handful of civil case opinions written by Judge Parker show him as a
studious and humane jurist. He was very careful to follow the law and
abstained from what today is called judicial activism, but his liberal attitudes
are clearly apparent. Most historians and biographers agree that Parker came
to Fort Smith as what we would call a political hack.'
He sought the
judgeship because he was a Republican in a Democratic state and was one of
a number of departing Republican congressmen in 1874 who needed an
appointment."56 That said, once he assumed this role, Parker continually grew
152. In re Monroe, 46 F. 52, 52-53 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891).
153. Id. at 58-59.
154. Id. at 53.
155. See, e.g., TULLER, supra note 1, at 49-50; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. I1, 1875, at 1.
156. After Parker becamejudge, he attempted to get his brother-in-law appointed as a special
attorney in the court, writing to the Attorney General with fulsome praise for Thomas Burnett,
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as ajurist dedicated to overseeing and improving the only real justice system
for the vast Indian Territory. While in Congress in the early 1870s, he
advocated and presented a bill that would have opened Indian Territory to
white settlement.'57 After he had served on the bench in Fort Smith for a few
years, his position had turned 180 degrees. During his tenure, he worked to
protect Indians from the incursion of settlers and from the depredations of
whites. By the 1890s, the Indian nations saw Parker as one of their closest
friends, and strongly opposed the reduction of his jurisdiction over Indian
58
country.'
In an interview with a newspaper in 1896, he said of Indians, "Twenty-one
years of experience with them has taught me that they are a religiously
inclined, law-abiding, authority-respecting people. The Indian race is not one
of criminals. There have been sporadic cases of crime among them, it is true,
but as a people they are good citizens."'3 9 Parker was convinced that gradual
assimilation into the majority society would be the salvation of the Indians,
but he opposed the opening of Oklahoma Territory to white settlement.
Realizing that white settlement was inevitable, Parker hoped that the federal
government would not immediately fulfill the demands to open the territory.
He lost that battle, but not for want of trying. 60 Parker expressed the view
that the Western District Court had a duty to protect the Indians:
The territory was set apart for the Indians in 1828. The
government at that time promised them protection. That promise
has always been ignored. The only protection that has ever been
afforded them is through the courts. To us who have located on
this borderland has fallen the task of acting as protectors. 16'
Even though the context of these remarks looks to the criminal jurisdiction of
the court, his civil cases reflect similar views.
the brother-in-law, who was a St. Louis attorney. Parker did not disclose the familial
relationship in his correspondence. See Stolberg, supra note 73, at 13-14. Parker also joined
Senator Powell Clayton in securing a position for Thomas Brizzolara as deputy prosecutor. Id.
See generally TuLLER, supra note 1.
157. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,at 830 (Feb. 5, 1872).
158. INDIAN CHIEFrAN, Nov. 19, 1896; INDIAN JOURNAL (Muskogee, Indian Territory), Apr.
30, 1888.
159. FORT SMITH ELEVATOR, Sept. 18, 1896, at 1.

160. See Robert H. Tuller, "The Hanging Judge" and the Indians: Isaac C. Parker and U.S.
Indian Policy, 1871-1896, at 63-74 (1993) (unpublished Master's thesis, Texas Christian
University) (on file with author); see also TULLER, supra note I, at 118-20. Tuller concluded
that, on the whole, Parker reflected the same ambivalent, ethnocentric, and paternalistic view
of Indians held by most whites in the same period.
161.

FORT SMITH ELEVATOR, Sept.
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Off the bench, Judge Parker was admired by the residents of Fort Smith.
They viewed him as a kind, benevolent man. Years after Parker's death,
Henry L. Fitzhugh, a Fort Smith lawyer who had appeared in Parker's court
judge to the
in his youth, said, "He was the kindest and most considerate
62
young lawyer whom I have ever seen upon the bench."'
When Judge Parker died in November, 1896,
[i]t was a state funeral, as nearly as the little city where he had
lived knew how to make it. Notable personages came from far and
near. Public and private business was suspended. Flags stood at
half mast. The National Cemetery, where he was buried, was too
small for the thousands who accompanied his body to its last
resting place. The most fitting and appropriate tribute of all came
placed upon his
when Chief Pleasant Porter, of the Choctaws,
63
grave a simple garland of wild flowers.
Perhaps the best tribute to Judge Parker is found in a single footnote in a
massive treatise. Professor John Henry Wigmore wrote the final revision of
volume one of Greenleafon Evidence just prior to releasing his own treatise,
Wigmore on Evidence. In the work, published in 1899, the text discusses the
issue of flight as evidence of guilt, and Wigmore inserted a footnote
containing an editorial comment: "See the reasoning in the charges of Parker,
J. (late the Federal District Judge for Western Arkansas and one of the greatest
American trial judges), in Starr v. U.S., 164 U.S. 627, and Alberty v. U.S., 162
id. 499." ' 64

162. Harry P. Daily, Isaac C. Parker: One of the Greatest American Trial Judges!, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FiFTH ANNUAL SESSION OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS

88, 97 (1932).
163. Id. at 107. Chief Pleasant Porter was a Creek, not a Choctaw. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text. This error appeared in a book, HOMER CROY, HE HANGED THEM HIGH 222

(1952). It was, unfortunately, restated by the United States Supreme Court in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 199 n.10 (1978).
164. 1 SIMON

GREENLEAF,

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

Henry Wigmore ed., 16th ed. 1899).
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